The Airborne Carrier Strike Group (A-CSG): Redefining Naval Power Projection

An “airborne carrier strike group” refers to a conceptual or emerging naval formation adapting traditional carrier strike group (CSG) principles to airborne platforms, such as large drone carriers or high-altitude airships, for power projection without sea-based vulnerabilities. Unlike standard US Navy CSGs—centered on a supercarrier with escorts, air wings, and submarines—this variant emphasizes aerial mobility for strike, surveillance, and defense in contested environments. | United States Naval Research Laboratory (NRL)

Intro

We’ve a next update on the 24/7 Airborne C-UAS Long-Range AI-driven Defense Platform (incl. AESA, HEL, HPM, A-CSG, Dual-Use / Wildfire): https://www.furtherium.com/p3

AESA: S/L/UHF/VHF/HF-band, 4D, SAR/InSAR, GPR/EOD, CRAM, C-UAS
HEL: 216 Terawatt Peak Power, 3 picoseconds Pulse Duration, 627 J Energy
HPM: 0-3,000 km incl. LEO, 1.18 GW Peak Power, 4.7 kW/cm2 in the spot
A-CSG: 12 STOL, 48 eVTOL rigid wing / rotor hybrid, 360 rotor small drones
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW): sonobuoys (VHF, optical fiber), radar, MAD

Dual-Use capabilities:

Aerial Firefighting: Wildfire Monitoring & Rapid Response, Containment & Suppression (A-F categories, CO2 7B tons/year or 15% of total)
Large fires in structures and skyscrapers, offshore oil and gas platforms, man-made disasters, and hazardous substances,
Disaster Relief
Search & Rescue
Oversized Logistics
Agriculture

24/7 Unmanned Aerial Firefighting Platform (Airship Drone / Swarm):

Investor Edition: https://furtherium.com/i2
Expert Edition: https://furtherium.com/p2
Military Edition: https://furtherium.com/p3

R&D stage, TRL-5, MRL-2

$4M Pre-Seed, SAFE. Looking for a lead investor — seven co-investors lined up.

High value asset (HVA)

Diameter 302 feet, height 66 feet, speed 80 mph (cruising) / 108 mph (maximum), 13,000 feet service static ceiling, 16,000 feet abs. dynamic ceiling. On board up to 12 STOL drones (IRS / strike / loitering munitions), up to 48 VTOL middle-size drones (IRS / strike non-suicide), up to 300 rotor-type small- and nano-size drones. In addition, 3 AESA, 3 HPM, 1 HEL.

First, let’s list the vulnerability factors and countermeasures:

Low radar (RCS) and thermal signature;
Low and zero noise levels;
Low-profile RF signature (Digital Beamforming <0.01°, polarization, hopping frequencies);
Smoke screen for low visual signature.

For comparison, most aircraft have:

significantly higher RCS and thermal signatures (except for the F-22 Raptor and F-35);
even medium-sized birds have higher RCS and thermal signatures;
significantly higher sound levels, audible even beyond line of sight (BLOS);
omnidirectional antennas, which make them noticeable during signal transmission;
a noticeable visual signature on a clear day and at low cloud cover at night with good starlight and moonlight at all LOS altitudes (even at altitude 50k feet).

I would also like to highlight the key features of this technology (AI-driven unmanned airship drone):

never operates alone (as part of a group and more often as part of a large group of naval, air, and ground forces);
long endurance, which is incomparably greater than any other aircraft;
omnidrive design and VTOL, which allow it to avoid predictable flight paths;
fairly high horizontal and vertical speed;
average altitude (13-16k feet), which is inaccessible to many munitions;
stability in case of partial damage to the shell (independent gas chambers);
stability for radar (active, semi-active, and passive), infrared, and acoustic self-guidance heads of missiles and loitering munitions;
energy camouflage (coating, shielding);
jamming systems (visual (water dispersions and solid particles of various sizes and densities), infrared (minimum ΔT for capture (2–5 K) is not reached), ultraviolet, laser illumination, radar jamming, false signals and targets);
false trigger activation systems (“capture window”) of self-guided heads based on target signals exceeding threshold values (contrast, intensity, Doppler shift, phase, periodicity, direction finding, wavelength, and modulation);
ultra-fast response and counteraction (less than 4 seconds total cycle from the start of the event to the target being hit) during the flight time for any threats (missiles, aircraft, ballistic munitions, radar systems, laser target illumination, electronic warfare systems);
defensive maneuvering along a complex trajectory.

Key capabilities that give friendly forces an advantage on the battlefield:

long endurance in the area of interest and multiple sensors (“eyes and ears around the world”);
advantages in different atmospheric conditions compared to satellites;
creation of multiple alternative P2P mesh network nodes for relaying radio communication signals to cover LOS communications with a highly directional beam pattern of non-detectable signals;
range and lightning-fast high-power countermeasures for all types of targets;
mobility, speed, piloting altitude;
autonomy, rapid decision-making using neural networks, trainability, error control;
large and scalable payload capacity (60-720k lb);
lowest cost of ownership and operation, infrequent maintenance intervals (13 weeks), no need for ground infrastructure;
versatility (modular design, options for different purposes).

In short, with the current defense budget, the combat power and defensibility of other existing forces increase exponentially, data exchange and logistical capabilities increase, the consumption of expensive ammunition decreases, and blind spots and the fog of war are reduced. Globally, the superiority of the US and allied military forces increases, while the hope of local victories for enemies decreases.

So, yes. This technology is both highly valuable as a target for the enemy and not so easy to destroy because it can defend itself. However, this technology must be deeply integrated into existing technologies and should not be considered in isolation.

Our images demonstrate the capabilities of simultaneously deploying ACGS (airborne carrier strike group: 12 STOL, 48 VTOL middle-class, 300 VTOL small and nano-class drones), 3 AESA installations, 3 HPM installations, and 1 HEL installation. Why was this done? To give experts a first impression of the main capabilities of new defense technologies.

But does it make sense and is it possible? The short answer is no.
The fact is that the payload of a single platform is limited to 60k lb.

At the same time, the weight of the options is as follows:

40k lb ACSG option:
- 14k lb STOL drones (x6 Hermes 900, x6 Lyutiy)
- 18k lb emals catapults and arresting gates (x12)
- 3k lb VTOL drones (x48 Stark Owe)
- 4k lb VTOL launch pads (x48)
- 1k lb VTOL small and nano drones, transformer hangars (x300)

48k AESA option (x3):
- ~16k AESA 1-layer multistatic 4D ultra wideband (S/L/HF/VHF/UHF-band) x1 (S 76 m2, x144 Radar Modular Assemblies (RMAs), 230,400 T/R GaN modules, ultra wide band 3D spiral fractal antenna vibrators, AIU/FTS, DBFS, RTSS, DSPS, RCPS/RSC, APDU, MPDU, cooling system)

45k lb HPM option (x3):
- ~15k lb HPM S-band 640 kW (32 klystrons with SF6 gas, 2,048 GaN modules, AIU/FTS, DBFS, RTSS, DSPS, RCPS/RSC, APDU, MPDU, cooling system)

52k lb HEL option (x1):
- x900 SuperCap MC, x8,100 Xenon Lamps Ushio UXL-16SB, x2,700 Nd:YAG lines, x54 Ti:Al2O3 lines and OPCPAs, 2,750 mm EPND 7-lenses optical objective, additional traction and focusing subsystem, cooling system

In other words, it is possible to connect three platforms vertically using a rigid coupling to ensure that the maximum take-off weight corresponds to the payload mass. However, there is a more rational solution.

The cost of the payload is always higher than the cost of the platform. It makes no sense to concentrate all capabilities on a single platform. They should operate as part of a division of 12-18 units, several miles or tens of miles apart:

3-4 AESA platforms operate in AEW&C multistatic radar mode, with a radius (horizon) of 131 mi and above for air targets – i.e., only one platform is in Tx mode at the same time (several seconds), while in Rx mode, all platforms are simultaneously – taking into account constant movement in 3D space at variable speeds and non-linear trajectories, as well as low RCS in passive mode of the platform;

2-3 HPM platforms provide (complement) the first layer (echelon) of defense at line-of-sight distances (ballistics 400-2,000 mi, high-altitude targets 250-400 mi, low-flying targets and cruise missiles 130-250 mi) – this is much further than today, but there may be limitations for targets with very high protection against EM effects and range limitations in difficult atmospheric conditions;

2-3 HEL platforms provide (complement) the second layer of defense at ranges up to 60 mi (in conditions of dense cloud cover, rain, and snow below) – this is also much further than today, but there are also range limitations due to atmospheric conditions;

1-2 ACSG platforms provide (complement) the third layer of defense with a radius of several tens of miles, alternately launching and receiving fixed-wing and hybrid (long endurance) drones for refueling with methanol, which perform ISR tasks, carry missile weapons on pylons, and have built-in systems for destroying low-speed targets without self-destruction;

4-6 refueling platforms (diesel fuel for the power plant extends endurance to 10-12 days, methanol for drones on board).

As is well known, the radius of the outer layer of defense for an aircraft carrier strike group, including tracking and countermeasures (E-2 Hawkeye AWACS aircraft, F-14 CAP fighters, F/A-18, F-35C/B) is 160–320 miles (up to 400–600 miles for detection). This is an early warning and interception zone for bombers/missile carriers, where radars, jammers, and Phoenix, SM-2/6, and ESSM missiles are used.

This is important to compare with new capabilities, especially for hypersonic targets of 5-12 Mach or 3,800-9,400 mph. It is clear that the defense radius needs to be increased, as flight time decreases with increasing speed.

Medium echelon: 30–260 miles (Aegis ships + deck-based aircraft for Phoenix, SM-2/6, and ESSM SAM missiles).

Close-in defense: less than 30 miles (SM-2/6, fighters with ASM tactical missiles). Rapid-fire guns and machine guns fit into the close-in echelon (CIWS — Close-In Weapon Systems, such as Phalanx CIWS (MK-15), SeaRAM, Goalkeeper) of the aircraft carrier group’s layered defense for the final interception of missiles, torpedoes, and drones at a distance of 0.3–3 mi. The main zone of CIWS is automatic fire at highly maneuverable targets that are resistant to SAM missiles. They are activated after the failure of long-range/medium-range/close-range echelons as a “last line of defense.” These systems complement the SM-2/6 and aviation, increasing survivability by 90% against ASCM.

Now imagine a scenario where a group of US ships or a US base is attacked by more than 20,000 AI-controlled drones per day at a speed of 160 mph, with 8-12 days of continuous strikes. The number of launchers on ships and weapons for fighter jets would not be enough for such an attack. And today, there are thousands of unflagged ships with containers around the world that could contain disposable catapults with drones. And if Russia is currently using 1,000 to 2,000 drones per day, what can we expect from China in five years? Missile weapons will lose the race against significantly cheaper drones.

How do you propose to defend that platform?

Now that the tactics for using this platform are clear, it is necessary to evaluate the scenarios for its application and the types of threats that exist.

Application scenarios / Operates as part of a group:

Escort of Carrier Strike Groups:
- as part of the USN missile and carrier fleet
Additional cover for critical infrastructure:
- as part of USAF, USMC, and US Army units
Independent patrolling of distant areas over the ocean:
- as part of a division of 18+ unmanned drone airships
Patrolling coastal waters:
- as part of USN / USCG ships, boats, helicopters, sea and air drones, and anti-submarine warfare aircraft
Patrolling land borders:
- as part of CBP ground and air forces
Supporting amphibious landings and marine operations:
- as part of USMC and USN air wing, ship, and forces support
Contested area control as 2nd and 3rd layer of defense:
- as part of USAF, USMC, US Army units
Logistics operations, CASEVAC, MEDEVAC:
- as part of USN, USAF, USMC, US Army, USSOCOM units
Relay of highly-directional radio signals in a wide range of frequency hopping:
- as part of USN, USAF, USMC, US Army, USSOCOM units

Important note: in most missions, unmanned airships and drones do not operate independently. Their main role is to extend the detection horizon, track targets, and provide instantaneous strike capabilities (at the speed of light). They also reduce the workload on pilots, increase sensor presence and coverage, and significantly increase combat power and the potential number of trackable targets.

Range / Potential Threats / Countermeasures:

400-2,000 mi:
- Guided missiles, jet aircraft and drones, naval forces:
  - Detection at a long range: ballistic missiles 400-2,000 mi (low probability of use, mainly used against stationary targets and ships);
  - Extension of the detection range to 400+ mi using ISR long endurance drones on board and AEW&C aircraft from the group;
  - Concentrated impact of 1-3 HPM on air targets;
  - Jamming by EA-18G Growler aircraft from the group;
- Directed energy (HPM, HEL):
  - Today, there are no mobile ground-based (and it is unlikely that they will appear in the future) or airborne (it is highly likely that this technology will be copied in the future) installations with a power of more than 10-50 kW due to technical and logistical (size, weight, power of the power plant) limitations, with a range of more than 3 mi;
  - The potential threat from currently non-existent projects for high-power, long-range marine installations is being studied, but every marine vessel and ship will be detected beyond the range of attack and considered under the zero trust doctrine;
  - The most sensitive electrical and electronic equipment on board is protected from EM pulses using advanced shielding technologies;

260–400 mi:
- Guided missiles, jet aircraft and drones, naval forces:
  - Detection by own AESA means;
  - High-altitude targets 250-400+ mi;
  - Extended detection range for low-flying and surface targets at distances of 130+ mi using ISR long endurance drones on board;
  - Concentrated impact of 1-3 HPM on air targets;

30–260 mi:
- The above plus low-flying targets, cruise missiles, surface and underwater targets:
  - Detection by own AESA, ASW and ISR drones on board of all types of targets;
  - Destruction of most targets by HPM and HEL directed energy weapons;
  - Expansion of strike capabilities with AAM guided missiles (AIM-120 AMRAAM, AIM-9 Sidewinder 120 mi) on pylons of fixed-wing drones such as the Elbit Hermes 900 (600-800 lb payload);
  - Expansion of strike capabilities through anti-submarine warfare capabilities on drone pylons;
  - Expansion of strike capabilities through ASM guided missiles on drone pylons;

2-30 mi:
- Anti-aircraft artillery (0.3-2.6 mi, 2-30% engagement probability), MANPADS (2-4 mi, 60-90% engagement probability):
  - See note below;

Most targets are effectively engaged at ranges of 30-260 mi. Reducing the range to 2-4 mi is potentially dangerous (see below), so these systems are most effective when used as a second and third layer of defense.

Warfare means that poses no threat or a low probability of threat

A drone flying at an altitude of ~2 mi at a 45° inclination to the surface has a range of ~3 mi, making it inaccessible to most types of anti-aircraft artillery and small arms. The only potential threat to a constantly moving airship drone is portable guided missiles launched from the surface (up to 4 mi, 1.3-2.6 Mach, flight time 6.5-8.5 s). Modern AESA, LWIR/SWIR sensors are capable of detecting a target in less than 2 seconds, tracking it, and hitting it with a high probability using HEL weapons during the remaining flight time (4-7 seconds).

Most threats (high-speed and low-speed, high-altitude and low-altitude, ground-based, sea-based, and submarine-based SAM launchers) can be detected with a significant fly-time margin to effectively counter them with onboard weapons (HPM, HEL, strike drones with AAM weapons).

General conclusions on types of threats:

AAM/SAM – can be detected and destroyed in a timely manner;
fighter jets – can be detected and destroyed in a timely manner;
attack helicopters – can be detected and destroyed in a timely manner;
attack drones of all types – can be detected and destroyed in a timely manner;
interceptor drones – can be detected and destroyed in a timely manner;
anti-aircraft artillery – can be detected and destroyed in a timely manner, low probability of threat;
MANPADS – can be detected and destroyed in a timely manner, low probability of threat;
Microwave emissions – low probability of threat at the current level of technology development, high degree of protection of sensitive elements by shielding;
Laser emissions – low probability of threat at the current level of technology development, but possible in the future if this technology is copied.

Weapons that pose a threat

In the future, similar airborne systems of this type may be developed with powerful directed energy weapons. Until then, the vulnerability of this defense technology is lower than that of most modern F-22 Raptor and F-35 fighter jets.

How long would it last in an A2/AD environment?

A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) is a military strategy aimed at limiting the enemy’s access to the area of operations and restricting their freedom of maneuver within it. Anti-Access (A2) uses long-range weapons (long-range missiles, bombers, submarines) to prevent entry into the area; Area Denial (AD) uses close-range systems (air defense, mines, artillery) to hinder actions already inside.

This is a hypothetical question about the survivability of a system, platform, or group (e.g., an aircraft carrier strike group) in an enemy’s A2/AD environment (such as Russia’s/China’s with Bastions, S-400s, hypersonic missiles, and numerous drones/loitering munitions that overload the defense system). In the context of discussing defense layers, it probably refers to the time a group can hold out under a massive attack by missiles, aircraft, and drones in the A2/AD zone (Kaliningrad, Crimea, South China Sea, Persian Gulf).

Short answer: weeks without A2/AD suppression, months with SEAD/DEAD operations.

More details

USN CSG: in Chinese A2/AD (DF-21D/26) – 10–60 min. under saturated attack without Combat Air Patrol (CAP) from aircraft carriers; with F-35/AWACS – hours to days with a loss of 20–50% of ships. China’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial Strategy – The Defence Horizon Journal
USN CSG + ACSG: in Chinese A2/AD (DF-21D/26), reinforced by several ACSGs (12-18 units for each ACSG) – weeks and months with a loss of less than 20% combat capability (given the multiple superiority in the number of enemy drones and missiles, including hypersonic ones – an advantage due to high-power directed energy weapons and an increase in the number of AEW&C sensors, plus the logistical capabilities of drones for the rapid supply of ships with ammunition)
Countermeasures: Stealth, EW (Growler), DEW (HPM, HEL), ACSG, sensor coverage, SM-6 extends from weeks to months, but A2/AD is evolving (2026: hypersonic).

What is the estimated cost of such an asset?

$4M – AI-driven airship drone platform (military edition)
$6M – Airborne Carrier Strike Group option (12 STOL EMALS catapults, 48 VTOL launch pads, DMFC infrastructure, 300 transforming hangars for small and nano rotor type drones)
$9M – AESA x1
$7M – HPM x1
$12M – HEL x1

Approximate cost of fully equipped ACSG divisions of unmanned airship drones:

$201M – 12 units, including 1 ACSG option, 9 AESA, 6 HPM, 2 HEL
$291M – 18 units, including 2 ACSG options, 12 AESA, 9 HPM, 3 HEL

Cost comparison, per unit:

$96.7M – AN SPY-6(V)4, 96 RMAs (Arleigh Burke Flight IIA) – AESA, Raytheon (RTX Corp.);
$8M – AN/APG-77 (F-22 Raptor) – Westinghouse (acquired by Northrop Grumman), Texas Instruments (acquired by Raytheon)
$17.5M – AN/APG-85 (F-35) – AESA (NGAP), Northrop Grumman
$6M – AN/APG-79 (F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, EA-18G Growler) – AESA, Raytheon
~$50M – Iron Beam (50 kW, 450 mm ENPD, fiber laser) – DDR&D, Rafael
$16M – ZEUS (3 PW laser, University of Michigan)
$4.2M – NIF (LLNL, 500 TW laser, ~1,8–2 MJ UV)
$10M – TIFR (India, ≥1 PW Ti:Sapphire laser)
$52M – AH-64E Apache
$35M – AH-1Z Viper
$20M – UH-60M Black Hawk
$101M – F-35A Lightning II
$150M – F-22 Raptor
$97M – F-15EX Eagle II
$70M – F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
$80M – F-16 Block 70
$283M – B-1B Lancer
$737M – B-2 Spirit
$1.3B – Ticonderoga (CG-47) (1980-1990)
$1.6B – San Antonio
$2.7B – Arleigh Burke (Flight III)
$3.5B – Virginia
$8B – Zumwalt
$9.3B – Columbia (SSBN)
$13B – USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78)

Here, we leave it up to you to draw your own conclusions about the economic benefits. You should also consider the high cost of operating naval and air forces, problems with recruiting and training personnel, opportunities for upgrading equipment, construction, maintenance, repair, and upgrade times, as well as the inability to use conveyor, automated, and fully robotic systems.

I will repeat our opinion above. It makes no sense to concentrate all capabilities on a single platform. They should operate as part of a division of 12-18 units.

How many divisions do the armed forces need?

This is only our estimate:

6 to 12 divisions assigned to a single aircraft carrier group, taking into account rotation every 13 weeks;
12 to 20 divisions for monitoring the Indian Ocean
20 to 40 divisions for monitoring the Atlantic Ocean
40 to 80 divisions for monitoring the Pacific Ocean
8 to 12 divisions for monitoring the Arctic Ocean
6 to 12 divisions for monitoring the Antarctic
approximately 20-30 divisions for monitoring the west and east coasts of the United States, the southern borders, and the southern coastal waters

What is the production capacity?

Our roadmap envisages the start of production near Munich with a capacity of 1-2 units per day (25-30 divisions per year) before the end of testing in 2028, starting in 2029-2030. Further expansion is planned through the construction of larger production lines in Texas and Australia.

The design was originally conceived with the aim of maximizing the use of automation and robotization, as well as the use of composites, vacuum casting, injection molding, additive technologies, and extrusion for medium and large elements.

Without exception, all of these technologies have been used for many years in various fields at the industrial level. We remind people of this every time they express doubts about whether such a thing is even possible. Globally, no new technologies have been invented; rather, accumulated experience has been used for a new design.

Our economic advantages for this project are:

availability of engineers for R&D near Munich, large educational and scientific clusters, high level of education and professional culture;
availability of many leading experts in the fields of aerospace, laser science, and radio engineering in Germany, ready to provide scientific and mentoring support;
developed support systems for innovative, energy-intensive, and climate-neutral industries from the Bavarian government;
complex technologies are a good barrier against copying;
strong motivation and perfectionism allow us to maintain a good pace and stay ahead of the competition in the race for innovation.

How to join the discussion

Let’s start a discussion in our expert community (AWS-hosted, not indexed by Google and OpenAI bots, by invitation only: https://furtherium.com/in1).

#Furtherium #Navy #ACSG #CUAS #AEWC #C5ISR #HEL #HPM #AESA #SAR #ASW #NVIDIAInception

Read how the new drones can help suppress wildfires and during rescue operations here.

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